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Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee)

Summary record of the 19th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 8 November 2000, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Semakula Kiwanuka ..... (Uganda)
later: Ms. Grčić Polić (Vice-Chairman) ..... (Croatia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Agenda item 86: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (A/54/670 and A/54/839; A/55/138-S/2000/693, A/55/305-S/2000/809, A/55/502 and A/55/507 and Add.1)

1. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that the Special Political and Decolonization (Fourth) Committee and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations performed an essential function, since it was through them that the Organization's Member States debated how peacekeeping should evolve and ultimately arrived at a common set of priorities for United Nations peacekeeping. The relevant reports and recommendations, the Organization's accumulated knowledge and the experience of peacekeepers in the field led to the conclusion that the instrument of United Nations peacekeeping must be strengthened immediately. The report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/54/839) contained more than 80 explicit recommendations on a wide range of peacekeeping issues. A report currently being prepared by the Secretariat would provide information on what had been done to implement those recommendations.

2. Peacekeeping meant keeping the peace, not waging wars. At the same time, the major reports on the subject illustrated that, in some cases, what was required was not just a symbolic presence, but also a credible military deterrent. He therefore agreed with the view that it would be dangerous and ill-advised to use peacekeepers as war-fighting forces.

3. In its report, the Special Committee had underlined that a well-conceived peacekeeping operation was one that contributed to overall efforts to help a country or region make the transition from war to sustainable peace and development. That meant that, in planning an operation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations must explicitly define and clearly identify those elements that should be incorporated into the mandates of peacekeeping operations. However, peacekeeping was distinct from social and development instruments, although the latter's effectiveness was reduced when they were applied in isolation from other efforts of the United Nations system to achieve lasting peace. The Department must therefore closely coordinate its activities with those of all the relevant partners of the United Nations system. Such collegial relations would be particularly vital for enhancing the Organization's capacity to conduct effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for former combatants.

4. Although the Secretariat did not take decisions on mandates, it was responsible for keeping the Security Council and troop-contributing States fully informed of the implications of specific mandates, providing frank appraisals of whether proposed mandates were sufficiently clear and precisely determining the resources required to implement mandates and ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers. In addition, open dialogue and consultations between the Secretariat, the Security Council and countries that contributed troops and police personnel must continue throughout the life of a mission to enable all parties to take informed decisions on all aspects of an operation. In particular, it was necessary to explain to contributors the risks involved in an operation and how they were to be addressed. To that end, he and his senior experts, including the Military and Civilian Police Advisers, would conduct more frequent and comprehensive briefings. There must also be a constant and open flow of information at all levels in the field: between contingents in a mission, between the various components of a mission and between peacekeeping missions and other United Nations entities working in the operational area.

5. It was understandable that many of the Special Committee's recommendations had focused on managerial issues. He would devote particular personal attention to efforts to ensure that the Department had an appropriate organizational structure and staff and to the further development of personnel policies and procedures that would enable the Department to attract and retain the most highly qualified staff.

6. According to the results of a review commissioned by the Secretariat, the number of staff members in the Department was less than 1 per cent of the total number of peacekeeping personnel in the field. The obvious understaffing of the Department led to a situation in which day-to-day emergencies took precedence over the reform of outdated procedures and systems. Further studies would be undertaken in the coming months to identify the total level of human and financial resources which the Secretariat needed to carry out its peacekeeping tasks adequately. The status

of those studies would be reported to the Special Committee in the context of the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of its recommendations.

7. Within the current structure of the Department, one Assistant Secretary-General dealt mainly with the political management of operations and relations with the Security Council, while a second was responsible for administrative and logistical support. The establishment of a third Assistant Secretary-General post, that of Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs, had been proposed to bolster the management team of an expanding Department, in which the inclusion of a Civilian Police Division and the strengthening of the Military Division had also been proposed. Another proposal concerned the restructuring of the Military Division, including the designation of senior officers to oversee tasks related to mission planning, force generation and management of the stand-by arrangements system for military personnel, training and evaluation, and military operations. Another significant structural change involved the strengthening of the Civilian Police Unit and the enhancement of the role of the Civilian Police Adviser. Moreover, it had been proposed that a small criminal law and judicial advisory unit should be established to provide operational support to the Civilian Police Adviser and his or her counterparts in the field.

8. The establishment of a public information unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as recommended by the Special Committee, would make it possible to address public information requirements in the planning process and to provide proper support to that key component of any peacekeeping operation.

9. It was also necessary to transform the Lessons Learned Unit into a peacekeeping doctrine and best practices unit. The new unit should manage the process of change in the Department. Intensified efforts should be made to ensure that that unit developed the necessary mechanisms for taking into account the valuable lessons learned at the field level and translating them into peacekeeping policy and practice to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of future missions.

10. Lastly, to ensure the systematic integration of gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations, a small gender unit should be established within the Department, as proposed in the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (A/55/138-S/2000/693). It should also be noted that the Security Council, in its resolution 1325 (2000), had recognized the need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations and had urged the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys, and also to seek to expand the role of women in field operations. For the implementation of that resolution, he planned to work in close cooperation with the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women to identify measures to be taken by both the Department and field missions. In addition, he appealed to the Member States to put forward women candidates for participation in all components of field missions.

11. With respect to issues of human resources management policy, he praised the commitment and experience of the personnel of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The men and women working in the field and in the Department were the Organization's greatest asset, and the success of peacekeeping efforts depended on them.

12. On the issue of field personnel versus Headquarters personnel, he believed that greater rotation of personnel between Headquarters and the field should be a top priority. Such rotation was not only good for morale; it was also essential for the effectiveness of peacekeeping. He was therefore intensifying efforts to bring experienced personnel from field missions to the Department as vacancies arose and, at the same time, to encourage the Department's staff to undertake field missions.

13. To improve the selection and preparation of senior field personnel, the Secretary-General, in following up the recommendations of the Special Committee, had called for the establishment of a senior appointments group which would formulate profiles for key positions, assist in the selection process and recommend appropriate training and briefing procedures.

14. Another important issue identified by the Special Committee was the need to enhance personnel security in the field. In that context, he had instructed field missions to keep that issue under constant review and to discuss it during briefings. There was also a need for further examination of the causes of hostile attacks on

peacekeepers and for assessment of how accident-related fatalities could be reduced. He was grateful to the Government of Japan for its offer to host a seminar on the safety and security of United Nations personnel in the field. On the basis of that seminar, a study on the security of peacekeepers would be prepared and submitted to the Special Committee. In addition, the General Assembly would soon begin its consideration of the Secretary-General's recent report on the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

15. The last important personnel policy issue was the adequate staffing of operations that required civilian expertise in new, often specialized areas. The Special Committee had called for a review of ways to obtain "non-military" personnel, particularly public information specialists and civilian police. The Department had already changed its eligibility requirements to allow retired police officers to serve in peace operations.

16. With respect to other categories of civilian personnel, the Secretary-General had indicated, in his report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/502), that further consideration should be given to the Organization's ability to obtain such non-military expertise, and had called for the establishment of an interdepartmental team to assess those needs and to ensure that a comprehensive approach was taken in that regard. As a short-term measure, the Secretary-General had asked the Department to evaluate the effectiveness of the delegation of recruitment authority to the mission in Kosovo and to consider how such authority could be delegated to other missions while ensuring adherence to the existing legislative framework and to the principles of geographical distribution and gender balance.

17. Referring to the need for rapid and effective deployment of peacekeeping forces, he said that the United Nations and Member States shared responsibility for the development of rapid deployment capacity. The Special Committee had called for the implementation of a number of measures in that connection, including the increase of contributions to the United Nations standby arrangements system and a review by the Secretariat of internal staffing procedures.

18. The Secretariat had not been able to make significant progress in the past year in implementing the Special Committee's recommendations in those crucial areas, largely due to a lack of resources in the Field Administration and Logistics Division. He welcomed, nevertheless, the Special Committee's invitation to the Secretariat to make proposals on ways of strengthening the logistics readiness of the United Nations and to review internal staffing procedures.

19. In his report on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations, the Secretary-General had made a series of proposals for the enhancement of the Organization's rapid deployment capacities. Those proposals had been formulated in furtherance of the Special Committee's recommendations. They included revitalization of the United Nations standby arrangements system, inclusion in it of specialized military units, enhancement of capacity to provide assistance with training to troop and police contributors, and development of a comprehensive logistics strategy for submission to the General Assembly in 2001.

20. In conclusion, he said that many things could be done to improve performance in all aspects of peacekeeping; some of them required additional resources, whereas others called for more efficient use of existing resources and reassessment of priorities. He had already talked about what could be done to help the Security Council adopt clearer and more achievable mandates, and to build a climate of trust through consultations, improve the structure and staffing of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and enhance the Organization's rapid deployment capacity. The sustained effort required to achieve those goals and the allocation of the necessary resources must be the product of political decisions. In that context, he looked to Member States, as partners in peacekeeping, to ensure that the rationale for such measures was understood, and to assist with their implementation.

21. The success of peacekeeping depended on whether the parties to a conflict showed the political will to cooperate with the United Nations and whether they honoured their undertakings. The Organization's Member States must also demonstrate political will by giving the operations political and material support. The strengthening of Headquarters capacity was very important, but it would be of little consequence if the Organization did not have enough troops, police or other civilian personnel to carry out the operations in the field.

22. When the Security Council adopted mandates for the conduct of operations, its members, including the permanent members, were obliged to ensure that the operations were provided with the necessary troops, police and logistical support. Otherwise, other countries, not having taken part in the adoption of those mandates, might be reluctant to participate in the operations themselves.

23. It was important not to lose sight of the international community's collective responsibility for maintaining peace and security. At the same time, the decision by any country to participate in a United Nations operation must be understood to represent a certain commitment. Of course, the decision to participate in an operation or to terminate such participation was the prerogative of the country itself, but such decisions should not be taken precipitously, so as not to compromise the operation.

24. The readiness to commit troops could depend on the financial means at a State's disposal. It was therefore essential that troop-contributing countries should be reimbursed for their expenses in a timely manner, but that could happen only if all Member States paid their assessed contributions in full and on time.

25. Of course, the Secretariat also had commitments in that area, and it would endeavour to fulfil them. He intended to meet frequently with the staff of missions in the field, to familiarize himself with their concerns and to bring operational, political, financial and other problems swiftly to the attention of Member States with a view to promoting a constructive dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States.

26. Field staff worked in difficult, and at times life-threatening conditions, and Headquarters should do all it could to support them. The success of operations depended not only on the commitment and sense of responsibility of Member States, but also on whether those operations were pursued as a truly collective endeavour. He looked forward to cooperation with all Member States, since it was only possible to work for the cause of peace together.

27. **Mr. Al-Hussein** (Jordan), welcoming the Under-Secretary-General on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that, in the two months since his appointment, he had demonstrated to Member States his openness and his readiness to tackle the diverse problems facing the international community in the field of peacekeeping. He asked the Under-Secretary-General what progress had been made in developing guidelines for the investigation of misconduct, in accordance with the request made by the Special Committee in paragraphs 65 and 66 of its report (A/54/839).

28. Member States viewed seriously the need for regular rotation of the officials of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations between field operations and Headquarters; he requested the Under-Secretary-General to make concrete proposals regarding the implementation of such rotation.

29. Turning to the issue of recruitment, he said that, in his statement, the Under-Secretary-General had attributed the failure to implement many of the recommendations relating to recruitment to a lack of resources. In his view, however, there were other problems in that area. The Special Committee had been recommending for several years that interviews should be conducted with senior United Nations military personnel before their deployment to the field. However, it had come to the attention of Member States that, in the case of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the Force Commander had been appointed without a preliminary interview and that he had not been called to Headquarters to be briefed until after assuming his post. That situation was attributable not to a lack of resources, but to a failure to heed the recommendations of the Special Committee. He asked the Under-Secretary-General to comment on the matter.

30. Regarding the issue of rules of engagement, he recalled that the Special Committee had long been seeking clarification concerning the status of the sample rules of engagement. Member States had requested that those rules should be formulated in close consultation with them. Regrettably, no such consultations had taken place, and the status of those rules was not known. He asked for an explanation in that regard.

31. Referring to paragraph 82 of the report of the Special Committee, he requested additional information on the status of the Secretary-General's bulletin on compliance with international humanitarian law by United Nations peacekeepers (ST/SGB/1999/13).

32. He also sought clarification from the Under-Secretary-General regarding the preparation of the

compendium of instances in which the Organization was due restitution as a result of non-compliance with status-of-forces agreements.

33. Turning to the issue of restructuring, he welcomed the efforts of the Under-Secretary-General to adopt a more efficient approach to the tasks facing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the basis of past experience, and recalled that it had been announced two years earlier that the Lessons Learned Unit would be merged with the Policy Analysis Unit for the very reasons set out by the Under-Secretary-General. However, that restructuring had not yet taken place. He sought clarification, in that connection, regarding the status of the Policy Analysis Unit.

34. Lastly, he referred to an issue of great importance for the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. In paragraph 149 of its report, the Special Committee called on the Secretary-General to sensitize all departments involved in the peacekeeping reimbursement process to the need to resolve current delays in reimbursing Member States. He asked the Under-Secretary-General what had been done in that regard.

35. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations), replying to the question concerning criminal investigations and the investigation of misconduct in the field, highlighted two aspects of that problem. First, the Department had been trying to observe the principle that missions should operate under a single command, and decisions on repatriation must therefore continue to be taken by force commanders. At the same time, the Department understood the concern of Member States, which did not wish to jeopardize the conduct of their own investigations. Consequently, it might become necessary, in some instances, to dispatch a special group to conduct an investigation in the field. That issue had been taken up with the Office of Legal Affairs, and a procedure had been developed and was being implemented in consultation with the Department. No problems were anticipated in that regard. The two investigations could take place in parallel, so long as information was provided as appropriate and consultations were held.

36. Turning to the question on rotation of staff between Headquarters and field operations, he said that he had paid close attention to that issue in his statement because of its importance. The difficulties surrounding that issue lay in the fact that there were various principles that needed to be reconciled. The Department was trying to ensure fairness, taking into account the factors of geographical distribution and competitiveness; all those principles needed to be considered simultaneously, which entailed certain difficulties at times. In his opinion, it would be desirable if staff were sent to the field at the beginning of their careers and acquired experience there before returning to Headquarters, and were then sent to work in missions periodically.

37. It was a question of policy. There was, in addition, the issue of sending staff recruited for missions to work in Headquarters. In that instance, the problem of ensuring fairness arose. Staff recruited to work at Headquarters after passing competitive examinations did not want to compete with persons who had not passed such examinations. That issue must be resolved. There was a need to find the right criteria, so that the issue of the transfer of staff from missions to Headquarters was resolved fairly. Experience of work in the field should be highly valued. That issue had procedural aspects, which also required attention. In making appointments, he would certainly take into account experience of work in the field.

38. He referred, in that connection, to the question on the Lessons Learned Unit. If effective changes were to be made in that Unit, the official heading it must have experience of work in the field. Only then would mission staff have confidence in his or her instructions and recommendations. That was particularly important in the context of the integration of the policy analysis and lessons-learned functions.

39. Reverting to the issue of rotation, he said that it was a matter of adjusting the rules and reconciling various elements. There was a need to ensure that experience of work in the field was regarded not as a drawback, but as an asset opening the way to promotion. Such an interpretation should facilitate the implementation of rotation.

40. Concerning the conduct of interviews with force commanders, he said that the Department well understood how important it was to have detailed information on persons appointed to such posts. In the specific case to which the representative of Jordan had referred, no interview had taken place because the Department knew the force commander well through

his previous work in peacekeeping operations. In all other cases, the interview was crucial.

41. Regarding rules of engagement, he said that, when such rules were drafted for specific missions, the official process of consultations with Member States was not utilized for three reasons: (a) because of lack of time; (b) because the preparation of materials for missions must take place without any political pressure, which could only complicate an already difficult process; and (c) because of security considerations, since publication of the rules of engagement for specific operations could have serious repercussions for the security of forces in the field, particularly in the deployment phase. The use of the official consultation process was not appropriate in that instance. At the same time, the Department often shared its views with troop-contributing States at the planning stage. Following the completion of that process, the rules were brought to the attention of all commanders of contingents in the field. If a State wished to participate in a particular mission and wanted to obtain information on the rules of engagement for that operation, the Department could provide it with such information confidentially. With regard to the sample rules, Member States were made aware of them in the context of assistance with training of peacekeeping personnel. That practice would continue.

42. The issuance of the bulletin on international humanitarian law was the responsibility of the Secretary-General. All efforts were being made to ensure that the contents of the bulletin were in complete accordance with existing international law. That involved collating the various ratified agreements which made up the totality of humanitarian law.

43. Responding to the question concerning the compendium of instances in which the Organization was due restitution as a result of non-compliance with status-of-forces agreements or other agreements, he said that the preparation of the data was now complete; the data was currently being reviewed by the Secretariat, and the compendium would soon be made available to Member States.

44. Referring again to the Lessons Learned Unit, he said that a major transformation of the Unit was currently under way. It would continue to operate within his Office, and he would be able to use the Unit as an instrument to effect change in the Department. Staff policy would play a key role in that process. The demands made of the head of the Unit also applied to his staff. The Unit's work must encompass all other units of the Department, drawing both on the experience of policy units and on managerial experience acquired by the Field Administrative and Logistics Division. He would second a member of the Unit to participate in the planning stage of new missions. That person would then keep him and the Unit informed to ensure that there was no discrepancy between the studies carried out by the Unit and actual planning. All of the Unit's studies should be concrete and action-oriented. He would closely monitor the Unit's work and the appointment of its members.

45. Replying to the question concerning the reimbursement of troop-contributing countries, he said that the current situation was associated with three factors: the administrative arrangements and procedures for reimbursement (which had already been reviewed in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services); an insufficient cash flow due to late payment of assessed contributions (that issue was outside his area of competence); and the conclusion of memoranda of understanding for contingent-owned equipment. That issue was extremely sensitive and necessitated further study. Memoranda of understanding were based on agreements between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries, and both parties must make efforts to resolve the issue. According to information provided by the Under-Secretary-General for Management, some payments would be made in the near future, allowing the current indebtedness to be reduced.

46. **Mr. Duval** (Canada) welcomed the statement made by the Under-Secretary-General, particularly its focus on restructuring, the allocation of posts, consultations with troop-contributing countries, and rapid deployment — issues which his delegation considered to be of great importance. Canada was well aware of the need to mobilize new resources to implement the changes envisaged by the Department. In that connection, the Secretariat's willingness to implement the Special Committee's recommendation to carry out a comprehensive resource analysis was most welcome. Rather than becoming embroiled in past and current problems, dynamic, forward-looking approaches should be identified. For its part, his delegation was willing to provide all possible

assistance to support the Under-Secretary-General's efforts.

47. Regarding the organization of work within the Committee, he hoped that after an informal exchange of views, there would be a general debate, during which he intended to convey in more detail his own delegation's position on peacekeeping operations.

48. **Mr. Sinha** (India) said that his delegation was gratified that the Under-Secretary-General in his statement had referred to dialogue with troop-contributing countries. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had for many years stressed the need for constructive and closer dialogue not only between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries, but also between those countries and the Security Council, moreover at the earliest stages of mission planning. In the light of the negative experiences in Sierra Leone in recent months, his Government looked forward to the issuance of the report of the working group on that issue and to the institutionalization of such dialogue.

49. With regard to the Special Committee's recommendation concerning a comprehensive review of the Department's activities, his delegation was disappointed that it had not been carried out. Instead of a comprehensive review, the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) had been submitted, which by the Panel's own admission was not comprehensive. No additional resources could be allocated until a comprehensive review had been carried out.

50. Furthermore, with regard to the issue of the correlation between the numbers of field and Headquarters personnel, according to the data supplied by the Under-Secretary-General in his statement, there were currently 400 staff in the Department, whereas the number of field personnel amounted to 58,000. His delegation believed it necessary to point out that according to the monthly reports, at the end of September there had been about 350 staff in the Department and 37,941 in the field. The ratio of Headquarters to field personnel had thus been 1.12, compared to 0.79 in 1992-1993, when peacekeeping activities had been at their height.

51. He was also interested in progress made with respect to the appointment of the Assistant Secretary-General for Logistics, Management and Mine Action. Despite the wide range of peacekeeping operations, that post had remained vacant since March 2000.

52. His delegation was in favour of strengthening the Mission Planning Service, the Civilian Police Unit and Office of Operations, but considered the upgrading in level of the Civilian Police Adviser in November 1999 to be unjustified. However, his delegation fully supported the strengthening of the Civilian Police Unit and its separation from the Military Division.

53. With regard to the question of countries recalling their troops from peacekeeping operations, he said that such decisions must not threaten the mission or the participating forces. While supporting such an approach, however, his Government noted from experience that both parties must fulfil their obligations. Concerning the Secretariat's obligations, it was important to consider whether the Secretariat and Security Council were taking account of the concerns of troop-contributing countries. If those concerns were ignored, States would have no alternative but to recall their troops from peacekeeping operations.

54. With regard to recruitment, he said that the representative of Jordan had referred in his statement to the appointment of the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), whereas the Under-Secretary-General in his reply had mentioned only the appointment of the Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). It was the view of his Government that the requirement to conduct interviews should be universal and they should be carried out uniformly and without any discrimination.

55. Regarding the recruitment of staff for the Department, he said that countries contributing the greatest number of troops, particularly developing countries, were under-represented in the Department. If that problem was not resolved, it would be difficult for troop-contributing States to agree to appointments for senior posts in the Department. Although the Brahimi report merely provided a partial overview, it envisaged a continuation of the comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations, particularly management issues. The findings would be of great significance in determining the Department's staffing table.

56. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations), responding to the question concerning the correlation between Headquarters and field personnel, said that there were 404 staff at Headquarters, 55 of whom were financed by the

regular budget, and the remainder by the support account. The figure he had given for the number of personnel in the field included military, police and other civilian personnel. Regarding the appointment of an Assistant Secretary-General for Logistics, Management and Mine Action, he said that the post would be filled in the near future.

57. He had reviewed the work of the Civilian Police Unit not only in relation to the missions in Kosovo and East Timor, but also in relation to other missions which carried out monitoring functions. The Unit was faced with extremely difficult challenges including the resolution of issues involving the interaction between the police and judiciary. It therefore needed to be headed by a senior official with great experience and authority, capable of maintaining contacts with troop-contributing countries at an appropriate level.

58. On the issue of recalling troops, he said that both parties must fulfil their obligations, and welcomed the cooperation with troop-contributing countries on the issue of Sierra Leone.

59. With regard to recruitment, he said that force commanders would be appointed only if they were known by the Secretariat from previous peacekeeping operations. In all other cases, the requirement regarding the conduct of interviews must be observed.

60. **Mr. Kawakami** (Japan) agreed that it was necessary to strengthen the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and to transform the Policy Analysis and Lessons Learned Units into a Doctrine and Best Practices Unit. His delegation also understood the need to strengthen other units of the Department, but felt that further consideration should be given to the question of establishing an additional post of Assistant Secretary-General in the Department.

61. **Ms. Grčić Polić** (Croatia), said that her delegation welcomed the Under-Secretary-General's intention to establish a gender unit, taking into account the considerable efforts already made to mainstream a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations, and bearing in mind the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action.

62. **Mr. Nega** (Ethiopia) said that as a traditional troop-contributing country to peacekeeping operations and the host of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, Ethiopia attached great importance to the work of the Department. It attached particular importance to consultations between the Department and troop-contributing countries, as well as with host countries, since the success of peacekeeping operations depended to a significant extent on their political will and their willingness to cooperate. Ethiopia also attached great importance to cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations and would appreciate information on measures being taken to implement the recommendations contained in paragraphs 159 and 164 of the report of the Special Committee (A/54/839), especially in respect of cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). He also wished to know whether it was true that the head of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was involved in the Standing High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), as reported in the media.

63. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations), referring to cooperation with regional organizations, in particular OAU, said that it was important to establish working-level contacts with them. In particular, exchanges of personnel between the Secretariat and OAU would be welcome. Regrettably, the heavy workload of Secretariat staff currently meant that it was not possible. As for the question of SHIRBRIG, he said that the staff of UNMEE included troops from individual countries participating in the Brigade, but they had been provided by those countries on an individual basis.

64. **Mr. Smith** (Australia) paid tribute to the staff of the Department in New York and in the field, who had worked very effectively over the past 12 months in extremely complex conditions, taking a creative approach. The current exchange of views was very useful. Australia largely agreed with the priorities mentioned in the Under-Secretary-General's presentation, in particular the need for realistic and feasible mandates, the strengthening of peacekeeping planning capacity, the restructuring of the Department, the conduct of consultations with troop-contributing countries and the enhancement of rapid deployment capacity. With respect to resources, it was particularly important that all assessed contributions should be paid in full and on time; that was an indisputable requirement.

65. **Mr. Zaki** (Egypt) said that he supported the overall positive strategic direction of the Under-

Secretary-General's statement and that he noted the necessity of considering the series of administrative and logistical issues it had raised. With respect to the proposed establishment of a new post of Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs, Egypt had repeatedly affirmed the need for the Military Adviser to report directly to the Secretary-General, since that would enable him or her to deal directly and frankly with specifically military matters, leaving aside political considerations. Moreover, Egypt attached great importance to the overall review of the regulations governing the preparation of memoranda of understanding, as well as those concerning troop-contributing countries. The problem was that the preparation of such memoranda could take one or two years, which was unacceptable for the countries that participated in peacekeeping operations.

66. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that, even if the proposed new Assistant Secretary-General post was established, the Military Adviser would continue to carry out his or her duties by advising the Under-Secretary-General on military matters, as was the current practice, and could also make recommendations on military matters directly to the Secretary-General. The availability of recommendations from a military professional was extremely important. The establishment of the new Assistant Secretary-General post would enable the Organization to avail itself of a second opinion. As relations with troop-contributing countries expanded, the Military Adviser, who dealt with strictly technical issues of planning, training and monitoring, should not devote too much time to maintaining contacts with Member States. That task would be among the duties of the Assistant Secretary-General. Thus, the authority of the Military Adviser would in no way be affected. With respect to the preparation of memoranda of understanding, that complex issue was currently being considered by a working group. A meeting on the subject would be held in January, and it was to be hoped that, by that time, many questions of principle would have been clarified, which would facilitate the conduct of negotiations with States.

67. **Mr. Brunet** (France) highlighted the importance of collective responsibility for ensuring the success of peacekeeping operations. It was abundantly clear that, in order to implement the recommendations made, the first requirement was to remedy the chronic understaffing of the Department and to take urgent action to institute the necessary reforms, in line with the Special Committee's recommendations.

68. **Mr. Toraasen** (Norway) said that he associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Croatia in support of the establishment of a small gender unit. In addition, he asked for further details about the inclusion, among the key policy issues, of the implications of the spread of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) in the field, as recalled in paragraph 12 of the Special Committee's report (A/54/839).

69. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that he had discussed that issue with the head of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). The deployment of peacekeeping operations could be used as an opportunity to raise awareness of the problem among troops and the general public. Specific actions would be taken in that regard, and an appropriate strategy was currently being elaborated in cooperation with UNAIDS.

70. *Ms. Grčić Polić (Croatia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

71. **Mr. Musonda** (Zambia) said he hoped that the recommendation to conduct a comprehensive review of the Department's activities would finally be implemented. With respect to paragraph 131 of the Special Committee's report, which mentioned the need to strengthen the Civilian Police Unit and to enhance the role of the Civilian Police Adviser, Zambia, like India, felt that upgrading the Adviser's post would not necessarily enhance his or her role. That could be accomplished by broadening the Adviser's functions and duties. His delegation was disappointed by the approach taken to the issue of the post of Military Adviser. While it agreed that Headquarters was responsible for giving strategic recommendations to field operations, it wondered why the Military Adviser's post was classified as D-1, whereas force commanders occupied Assistant Secretary-General posts. If the Military Adviser was to be truly able to direct the work of force commanders, he or she should occupy a post at the same or a higher level. His delegation felt that the role of the Military Adviser must be enhanced, since the latter was responsible for making recommendations to the Security Council and directing the work of force commanders. The need for

a post of Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs, to which it had been recommended that a civilian should be appointed, was not entirely clear to his delegation.

72. His delegation was concerned about the representation of developing countries on the Department's staff. It shared the view of the Croatian delegation on the importance of taking a gender perspective into account. The degree to which women were marginalized had finally been understood, and the desire to rectify the situation had arisen. The time had also come to recognize how marginalized developing countries were in terms of their representation in the Department. He wondered what would be done to rectify that situation. To improve the representation of developing countries, it was necessary to take even more decisive measures than in the area of gender balance.

73. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that the Military Adviser occupied a D-2 post, whereas force commanders were appointed to posts on the basis of their military rank. No problems had ever arisen in the relations between them. The proposal to appoint a civilian to the new Assistant Secretary-General post reflected the general principle that military officials should be accountable to civilian authorities. The issue of geographical balance was indeed problematic. Currently, it was being considered at the Secretariat-wide level, and steps were being taken to address it.

74. **Mr. Osei** (Ghana) said that he supported the statement made by the representative of Jordan, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. As a major troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations, Ghana was pleased to note that the Under-Secretary-General recognized the importance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for former combatants in the context of post-conflict peace-building. It was clear to the countries which had participated in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) that that Mission had demonstrated that, without well-conceived programmes of that type, former combatants might well revert to activities that could seriously undermine the peace process and even threaten the peace and security of an entire subregion. Accordingly, he hoped that, in future, the Department would give that aspect of conflict resolution the attention it deserved.

75. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said he agreed that such programmes were extremely important. Peacekeepers could stabilize a situation, but long-term solutions depended on the success of those programmes.

76. **The Chairman**, speaking in her capacity as the representative of Croatia, said that she could attest to the tremendous importance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for former combatants in Eastern Slavonia.

77. **Mr. Andresen Guimarães** (Portugal) said that, as noted in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), the Secretariat, in reporting to the Security Council on situations that could lead to the deployment of peacekeeping operations, must tell the Council what it needed to know, not what it wanted to hear. However, that did not always occur in practice. Some felt that the Security Council gave preference to options that were politically feasible, but often insufficient. He asked what practical steps could be taken by the Secretariat to request, for each mission, an optimal number of personnel and an optimal mandate.

78. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that the Secretariat was obligated to set forth the facts as they were and to prompt the Security Council to fulfil its responsibilities. In the end, it would always be obvious to what extent the real needs were being met and whether there was political will to meet them. That was the basis for the concept of "two-step" resolutions (a framework resolution followed by a second resolution specifically concerning the deployment of a mission). There was no simple answer to the question posed by the representative of Portugal, but it should be noted that, in each case, the Secretariat must act with complete frankness.

79. **Mr. Taylor** (United Kingdom) said that he supported the statement made by the representative of France, on behalf of the European Union. The analysis, in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, of the issue of partnership was particularly interesting. Member States should provide more support to the Secretariat. He hoped that, when the Fifth Committee considered the allocation of resources to the Department, it would be able to agree on an appropriate package. Of course, if Member States strengthened their support for the Department, they

would be entitled to make greater demands on it. Over the past year, the Department had worked very well despite extraordinary circumstances and a shortage of staff. In that connection, the current debate was very timely.

80. With respect to the report of the Special Committee (A/54/839), he asked for information on the status of consultations between the Department and the Special Committee concerning the Secretary-General's bulletin on the observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law (ST/SGB/1999/13), and wondered what progress had been made in the establishment of a forum for Member States interested in cooperating with peacekeeping in Africa, such as by providing training or equipment.

81. He noted, from the statement made by the Under-Secretary-General, that the Lessons Learned Unit was to be transformed into a peacekeeping doctrine and best practices unit, and wondered why the term "doctrine" had been chosen. Moreover, he noted that the Under-Secretary-General intended to put forward a proposal to shift the Department's financing from the support account to the regular budget, and asked who would carry out the in-depth study envisaged in that connection.

82. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that the Secretary-General's bulletin was simply a set of principles which were already enshrined in international agreements. Observations by Member States in that regard would, of course, be welcome. With respect to the forum on peacekeeping in Africa, the strengthening of the military component, including training, would enhance the Department's capacity to cooperate in various initiatives. In those efforts, the Department would be guided by general standards for the training of participants in peacekeeping operations, particularly those in Africa. He welcomed the United Kingdom's contribution in that regard, particularly in the framework of the Special Committee.

83. The term "doctrine" did not imply a "doctrinaire" approach. In the implementation of specific tasks, the need for various adjustments naturally arose, but it would be useful to have guiding principles that would not have to be reconsidered each time. On a number of issues and operating procedures, the existence of a doctrine would immediately clarify what was involved, and what must be done to increase the effectiveness of the actions taken. The in-depth study referred to by the representative of the United Kingdom would be carried out by outside experts. That would enhance the authoritativeness and objectivity of the study, which would require the examination of a whole series of managerial, logistical and purely operational issues.

84. **Mr. Salamanca** (Bolivia) said that he agreed with the need to establish a strong military force capable of fulfilling the Security Council mandates and having the authority which the Organization needed to carry out its obligations under the Charter in the area of the maintenance of international peace and security.

85. His delegation joined others in welcoming the establishment of a gender unit in the Department. Training in the area of peacekeeping must also be arranged for civilian personnel assigned to missions, as, in contrast to training for military staff, currently it was not being conducted.

86. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) agreed that the training of personnel, including civilians, was highly important, since peacekeeping operations were often complex in nature. Personnel were needed with the most varied skills, some which could be taught, others which were gained with experience. The question of the career development of staff recruited for peacekeeping was also related. In terms of career development, it was important for a staff member to gain practical experience in the field from the beginning of his or her career.

87. **Mr. Steer** (New Zealand) said that the proposed changes in the Department would lay a good foundation for the continued improvement of its work and, hence, of United Nations peacekeeping operations. He hoped that the restructured Lessons Learned Unit would become an important tool which would make a significant contribution to the work of the Department. His delegation supported the work on gender mainstreaming and the development of complex peacekeeping operations. The establishment of the Gender Unit was a step in the right direction. It should be noted that, despite the difficulties, the staff of the Department was highly effective in its work.

88. **Mr. Mangachi** (United Republic of Tanzania) said that coordination and harmonization of staff training programmes were needed, and a long-term plan for the establishment of "on-call" lists of staff with the skills required for any peacekeeping operation

must be developed. There was a danger that those processes would not include representatives of less developed countries, especially in Africa. He would like to hear the views of the Under-Secretary-General on the medium- and long-term possibilities of establishing such "on-call" lists, which would open up equal opportunities for all countries.

89. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that, from the outset, it was necessary to define what the Secretariat could and could not do. The Secretariat was unlikely at any time to have sufficient resources to organize staff training independently. Such training must be organized by Member States with sufficient resources at their disposal. The Secretariat could and should ensure the compatibility of staff training programmes and develop appropriate standards. Its ability to perform that task depended on having the staff to devise such standards, which must also be translated into different languages.

90. **Mr. Olang-Dulo** (Kenya) said that countries were expected to contribute equipment as well as troops. Many developing countries experienced problems when the equipment was contributed under "wet lease" arrangements. That problem had also been noted by the Security Council mission which had recently visited Sierra Leone. He would be interested to know what the Department was doing in that respect.

91. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that he was not familiar with all the details of that difficult question. The system of equipment leasing had been reformed quite recently. Currently there was a choice between "wet lease" and "dry lease" arrangements. Countries which owned the equipment which was provided preferred a "dry lease" arrangement, but that posed problems in providing technical and operational support. In general the Secretariat needed to know ahead of time whether additional arrangements would have to be made for technical servicing. He undertook to provide additional information on that question.

92. **Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoué** (Côte d'Ivoire) was pleased to note the openness with which the Under-Secretary-General had spoken about the problem of the lack of political will. That was the main problem, especially at a time when the United Nations was preparing to turn a new page in the history of peacekeeping operations. A week earlier the Secretary-General had called for countries to contribute troops to be sent to Sierra Leone. It had been evident how "diplomatic" the response had been to that appeal. Even if the best people were available, they were useless if there was no will to assign them.

93. The time had come to recognize the problem of a double standard. When it was a question of Africa, a wide variety of problems arose and the search for solutions dragged on. In the case of other regions, however, the entire mechanism of the United Nations was quickly engaged and missions were rapidly deployed.

94. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) agreed with the previous speaker. It was a question of the authority of the Organization, which, when it needed to act, must be provided with the appropriate resources. There was no room for geographical priorities — solidarity was needed.

95. **Mr. Isah** (Nigeria) said that his country, which provided large troop contingents for the United Nations, fully supported the plans for reorganization of the Department, which were intended to raise the quality of its peacekeeping activities. He recalled that the evaluation mission sent recently by the United Nations to Sierra Leone had made recommendations concerning how to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate events which had taken place in May 2000. That mission had recommended the establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the deaths of peacekeepers and identify violations in the work of the mission. It had not yet been possible to learn the conclusions of that commission of inquiry. He would like to receive information on what had been concluded with reference to Sierra Leone.

96. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that the establishment of commissions of inquiry was standard procedure. Since the conclusions reached by the commission dealt with sensitive questions, they would be issued as an internal document of the United Nations, intended only for official use. In addition, they would be made available on a confidential basis to the States involved. When the conclusions of the commission for Sierra Leone were ready, Nigeria would be made aware of them, since in that instance it was one of the parties involved.

97. **The Chairman** expressed the hope that the positive dialogue which had taken place would be renewed in the future in many different forms.

98. **Mr. Guéhenno** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) was pleased to note that both the questions addressed to him and the criticisms of the Department were an essential part of a healthy dialogue, which must be continued.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.